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INTENT MATTERS: ASSESSING SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY FOR TRIBAL ENTITIES
Gregory J. Wong
Abstract: Indian tribes create corporations and agencies, such as casinos and economic
development organizations, to further tribal goals. When such an entity is sued, the courts
must determine whether the entity shares in the tribe's inherent sovereign immunity. Like
tribes, the federal and state governments also create corporations and agencies to further their
governmental goals. To determine whether such a federal entity shares in the federal
government's sovereign immunity, the courts ask if Congress intended to grant the entity
immunity from suit. For state entities, courts ask if the state government intended to extend
its sovereign immunity to the entity by examining how state law characterizes the entity. The
courts have designed a variety of tests to determine when a tribal entity shares in a tribe's
sovereign immunity but none of these explicitly examine the intent of the tribe. This
Comment argues that courts err if they do not examine a tribe's intent to extend its sovereign
immunity to a tribal entity when analyzing the entity's amenability to suit. The courts defer
to federal and state intent due to their status as sovereigns. Tribes are similarly sovereign
governments. Federal, state, and tribal sovereign immunity all derive from the same source.
Although Congress has the power to change or abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, thus far
Congress has not chosen to alter the extent to which tribal entities may benefit from a tribal
government's immunity from suit.
Immunity from suit is an inherent aspect of sovereignty rooted in
common law.' Courts have abandoned the historical notion that
governments possess immunity from suit because the "king can do no
wrong" and today justify sovereign immunity as a means to both protect
the treasury and prevent the state apparatus from being turned against
itself.2 Sovereign immunity extends beyond the sovereign in the strictest
sense to include government corporations and agencies that operate as an
arm of the sovereign. 3 However, not every entity created by a sovereign
is entitled to the protections of sovereign immunity.4
1. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-16 (1979) (discussing common law roots of sovereign
immunity).
2. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a tribal community college incorporated under the tribe's constitution is entitled to
sovereign immunity as an arm of the tribe); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund,
493 F.2d 177, 180 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that a state entity, the State University Construction
Fund, shares the state's immunity from suit). For clarity, this Comment will use the word "entity" to
refer to both corporations and agencies.
4. See, e.g., S.J. v. Hamilton County, 374 F.3d 416, 423-24 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
juvenile training facility chartered by the state but funded and operated by the county is not an arm
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Because sovereign immunity defines whether or not a court has
jurisdiction over a suit,5 it is the duty of the courts to determine whether
sovereign immunity has been extended to an entity created by a
sovereign.6 When considering the extension of federal or state sovereign
immunity, courts look to whether the government creating the entity
intended the entity to share in the sovereign's immunity from suit. 7 In
other words, courts give deference to whether the sovereign intended to
extend its immunity to an entity.8 To determine the sovereign's intent,
courts look to how the entity is characterized by the sovereign's law.9 If
there is no explicit language in the law that either preserves or waives
sovereign immunity for the governmental entity, courts will analyze
various factors to determine legislative intent.1°
The U.S. Supreme Court has not established a test to determine when
tribal agencies and corporations share in the tribe's sovereign
immunity. 1 Nevertheless, state and lower federal courts have developed
a variety of tests for this analysis. 12 Yet, unlike the tests employed in the
of the state for sovereign immunity purposes); Standard Oil Div., Am. Oil Co. v. Starks, 528 F.2d
201, 204 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that the U.S. Postal Service does not share in the federal
government's immunity from suit); Runyon v. Ass'n of Vill. Council Presidents, 84 P.3d 437, 441
(Alaska 2004) (holding that an Alaska nonprofit corporation created by sovereign tribal villages
does not enjoy tribal sovereign immunity).
5. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) ("Indeed, the terms of the United States' consent
to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." (internal quotations
omitted)).
6. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is, emphatically, the
province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is."); see also, S.J., 374 F.3d at
423-24 (holding a state-created entity does not enjoy sovereign immunity and is therefore subject to
the court's jurisdiction); Starks, 528 F.2d at 204 (holding a federally-created entity does not enjoy
sovereign immunity and is therefore subject to the court's jurisdiction); Runyon, 84 P.3d at 441
(holding a tribally-created entity does not enjoy sovereign immunity and is therefore subject to the
court's jurisdiction).
7. See Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 231 (1935) (giving deference to the
federal government's intent due to its sovereign power); S.J., 374 F.3d at 421-22 (pointing to the
states' sovereignty as a reason to examine a state's intent as demonstrated by the state law creating
the entity).
8. See Priddy, 295 U.S. at 231; S.J, 374 F.3d at 421-22.
9. See Priddy, 295 U.S. at 231; S.J., 374 F.3d at 421-22.
10. See infra Part III.C.
11. See Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 293 (Minn. 1996); Wright v. Colville Tribal
Enter. Corp., 147 P.3d 1275, 1283 n.5 (Wash. 2006) (Madsen, J., concurring).
12. See, e.g., Local IV-302 Int'l Woodworkers Union v. Menominee Tribal Enters., 595 F. Supp.
859, 862 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (stating that all actions against tribal entities are actions against the tribes
themselves); Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1109 (Ariz. 1989) (granting immunity
only to economic organizations subordinate to a tribe); Gavle, 555 N.W.2d at 294 (adopting a three-
factor test); Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund, Inc., 658 N.E.2d 989, 992 (N.Y.
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context of federal and state sovereign immunity, none of the tests in the
tribal context consider the tribe's intent in creating the entity. 13 Courts
ignore the tribe's intent, an important factor in the federal and state
contexts, and primarily assess the entity's relationship to the tribal
government.14
This Comment argues that tribal intent should be a factor in
determining whether sovereign immunity extends to tribal entities. Part I
of this Comment discusses the nature of federal, state, and tribal
sovereign immunity, concluding that they all spring from the same
source. Part II examines the courts' inability to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity. Part III outlines how courts defer to the intent of federal and
state governments when determining whether a governmental entity
shares in the sovereign's immunity from suit. Part IV examines how
state and federal courts have not taken the tribe's intent into account
when analyzing whether a tribal entity shares in the tribe's sovereign
immunity. Part V argues that because courts defer to federal and state
intent when examining whether a governmental entity enjoys sovereign
immunity, and because tribal sovereign immunity does not differ from
state or federal immunity in this context, courts should also defer to
tribal intent when determining whether sovereign immunity extends to
tribal entities in the absence of any congressional instruction to the
contrary.
I. FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS ENJOY
INHERENT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine that prohibits a
sovereign from being sued in its own courts. 15 The federal government,
1995) (identifying nine factors to consider); see also infra Part IV.B.
13. See infra Part 1i1.C.
14. See id.
15. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-16 (1979) (discussing common law roots of sovereign
immunity). The one variation from this rule is that states are not immune from suit in other state
courts. Id. at 426-27. The U.S. Supreme Court has not interpreted tribal sovereign immunity to
require an analogous rule as it has consistently allowed Indian tribes to successfully assert their
sovereign immunity in the state and federal courts. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754-56, 760 (1998) (recognizing that tribes are not limited by the Constitution
in the same way states are in holding sovereign immunity applies to tribal business transactions
conducted off-reservation in a suit brought in state court); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 507-09 (1991) (holding tribal sovereign immunity
applies to counterclaims brought against a tribe in federal district court).
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as sovereign in the United States, enjoys immunity from suit. 6 States1 7
and Indian nations,18 as co-sovereigns with the federal government over
their respective people and territories, also enjoy inherent immunity
from suit. The sovereign retains this inherent immunity absent some
alteration by Congress or the sovereign itself. 9
A. Sovereign Immunity Is a Common Law Bar to Suit
Immunity from suit is an absolute and inherent right enjoyed by
sovereigns 20 that operates as a jurisdictional bar2' preventing a sovereign
from being sued in its own courts.22 This doctrine finds its historic roots
in the common law notion that the "king can do no wrong., 23 The
modem doctrine is generally based on the premise that a sovereign has
the ability to create legal rights without having such rights claimed
against it.24 Sovereign immunity is also justified today as a means for the
government to fulfill its governmental duties without competing legal
claims impacting the sovereign's treasury.25
16. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,475 (1994).
17. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
18. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 635-38 (Nell J. Newton et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the nature of tribal
sovereign immunity).
19. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (discussing tribal sovereign immunity); Tucson
Airport Auth. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing federal
sovereign immunity).
20. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 414-16 (discussing common law roots of sovereign immunity); THE
FEDERALIST No. 81, at 248 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966).
21. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475 ("Indeed, the 'terms of [the United States'] consent to be sued in
any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit."' (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941))).
22. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 414-16.
23. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *246 ("The king, moreover, is not only
incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper
thing....").
24. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 415-16 ("Mr. Justice Holmes explained sovereign immunity as based
'on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends."' (quoting Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349,
353 (1907))).
25. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750-51 (1999).
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B. The Federal Government Enjoys Inherent Immunity from Suit
As a sovereign, the federal government and its agencies enjoy
inherent immunity from suit.26 Suits against the United States begin with
a presumption that no relief from the sovereign is available to litigants.27
As such, federal sovereign immunity is absolute, and can only be altered
or waived by Congress. 28  To successfully waive the federal
government's sovereign immunity, Congress must unequivocally
express the waiver through the language of a statute.29 Congress has
chosen to utilize such an unequivocal waiver in numerous areas,3 °
including, for example, subjecting the United States to suit for certain
torts committed by federal employees under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.3'
C. States Retain Their Inherent Sovereign Immunity Subject to the
Supremacy of the Constitution and Federal Government
States are co-sovereigns with the federal government over their
territory and citizens.32 As such, states retain their inherent sovereign
immunity from suit. 33 State sovereign immunity derives from the states'
status as sovereigns prior to ratification of the U.S. Constitution and is
affirmed by the Eleventh Amendment.
34
26. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475; Morris v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 222
(D.C. Cir. 1986). In our republican form of government, ultimate sovereignty resides in the people.
See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935). The people, in turn, grant power to public
officials who operate as agents in a representative capacity. See id.; Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v.
Union Sav. Bank Co., 162 N.E. 420, 421 (Ohio 1928).
27. See Tucson Airport Auth. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 1998).
28. See id.
29. See United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1993); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392,
399 (1976).
30. See 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR P. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3656 (3d ed. 1998) (detailing the major areas the federal government
has waived its sovereign immunity).
31. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (2000).
32. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-15 (1999).
33. See id. at 713.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-13. In Alden, the Court clarified that the
Eleventh Amendment serves only to reaffirm the states' inherent sovereign immunity. Alden, 527
U.S. at 712-13. The Eleventh Amendment bars Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity
using its Article I powers, but does not do so when Congress exercises powers derived from
amendments subsequent to the Eleventh Amendment. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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The U.S. Supreme Court has held that state sovereign immunity may
be limited in certain circumstances. For example, states may waive their
immunity by consenting to suit.35 Any such waiver may not be implied
but must be unequivocal.36 In addition, state sovereign immunity may be
limited or abrogated by Congress.37 State sovereign immunity is subject
to the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes. 38 For
example, Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity by enacting
explicit and unequivocal legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.39
D. Indian Tribes Retain Their Inherent Sovereign Immunity Unless
Waived by the Tribe or by Congress
Like federal and state governments, Indian tribes possess sovereign
immunity from suit.40 Tribal sovereign immunity is an inherent right
35. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755.
36. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680-82
(1999) (holding that Florida did not expressly waive its sovereign immunity by participating in
interstate commerce); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1990)
(holding that a state entity unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity from suit where it entered
into a bi-state compact containing a consent to suit provision).
37. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Congress may abrogate
state sovereign immunity using its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment).
38. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1947) ("[T]he Constitution and the laws passed
pursuant to it are the supreme laws of the land, binding alike upon states, courts, and the people,
'any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."' (citing U.S.
CONST. art. Vl, § 2)).
39. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 ("We think that Congress may.... for the purpose of
enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or
state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts."). The "impermissible"
contexts Fitzpatrick refers to arise due to the Eleventh Amendment, which precludes Congress from
using its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000) (holding that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment
Act did not abrogate state sovereign immunity); Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (holding that Congress may
not use its Article I powers to subject a state to suit in state court without its consent); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635-36 (1999) (holding that
neither the Commerce Clause nor the Patent Clause provided Congress with authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47, 53 (1996) (holding
that an action by a tribe pursuant to a statute passed under authority of the Indian Commerce Clause
was precluded by the Eleventh Amendment).
40. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509
(1991) ("Indian tribes are 'domestic dependent nations' that exercise inherent sovereign authority
over their members and territories. Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity
absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation." (internal citations omitted)); Three
Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986) ("The
common law sovereign immunity possessed by the Tribe is a necessary corollary to Indian
sovereignty and self-governance."); Santa Clam Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)
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derived from the tribes' status as sovereign nations prior to European
conquest.41 As such, tribal sovereign immunity extends to all of a tribe's
governmental and commercial activities regardless of- whether the
activity takes place on or off its reservation.42
As with federal and state sovereign immunity, tribal sovereign
immunity may only be waived by either the sovereign itself43 or
Congress. a As in the other contexts, waivers of tribal sovereign
immunity must be unequivocally expressed.45 In the absence of such an
explicit waiver, Indian nations are absolutely exempt from suit.
4 6
Although Congress may waive tribal sovereign immunity, it has only
chosen to do so in limited classes of suits. 47 For example, Congress has
chosen to expose tribes to suit in the areas of mandatory liability
insurance48 and gaming activities. 49 Nevertheless, Congress has not
limited the tribes' ability to share their inherent immunity from suit with
tribal entities. 50 To the contrary, the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity has been consistently acknowledged and approved of by
("Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers."); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Wash. Dep't of Game, 433
U.S. 165, 172-73 (1977); United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1940);
Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919).
41. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 55-58 ("As separate sovereigns pre-existing the
Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional
provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority .... Indian tribes have
long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by
sovereign powers.").
42. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998).
43. See id. at 754.
44. See id. at 756 ("[T]ribal immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution
by the States."); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58.
45. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58-59 (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399
(1976)).
46. See id. at 58.
47. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 759.
48. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(c)(3)(A) (2000) (waiving tribal sovereign immunity for insurance claims
mandated under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act).
49. Id. § 271 0(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2000) (giving federal district courts jurisdiction over claims by a state
or tribe that class III gaming activities are occurring on tribal lands in violation of a Tribal-State
gaming compact).
50. See Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), affd, 555 N.W.2d
284 (Minn. 1996) (reasoning in part that because "Congress has left the issue unresolved[,]" a tribal
casino benefits from the tribe's sovereign immunity).
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Congress as a means to promote tribal self-sufficiency, economic
development and self-government.5'
In sum, sovereign immunity bars suits against sovereigns. The
federal, state, and tribal governments all enjoy inherent sovereign
immunity as an aspect of their sovereignty. Federal, state, and tribal
sovereign immunity may be altered either by valid congressional action
or by the sovereign itself. Absent such alteration, a sovereign's
immunity from suit remains undiminished.
II. COURTS MAY NOT ABROGRATE TRIBAL SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
Under existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, courts may not
abrogate the sovereign immunity of tribes 2 Specifically, the judiciary
defers to the power of Congress on questions of tribal sovereign
immunity.53 While Congress may implement comprehensive legislation
to limit tribal sovereign immunity, the Court has refused to impose
additional judicial limitations on the tribes' immunity from suit.54 This is
true even where the Court expresses misgivings about particular
applications of the doctrine. 5
51. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla, 498 U.S. 505, 510
(1991) (citing the Indian Financing Act of 1974 § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (2000) ("It is hereby declared
to be the policy of Congress to... help develop and utilize Indian resources") and the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act § 3 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b)
(2000)) ("The Congress declares its commitment to ... the establishment of a meaningful Indian
self-determination policy .... In accordance with this policy, the United States is committed to
supporting and assisting Indian tribes in the development of strong and stable tribal
governments ....")).
52. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758-60; Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 510 ("[W]e are not
disposed to modify the long-established principle of tribal sovereign immunity."). The federal
judiciary has made it clear that only the tribe itself or Congress may abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity. See Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of
American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REv. 661, 699-700 (2002). Under the established
doctrine, the courts possess "interpretive latitude" in construing when such a waiver exists, but they
may not independently abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. See id.
53. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758-60.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 758 (acknowledging that "[t]here are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating
the doctrine" of tribal sovereign immunity, but choosing to "defer to the role Congress may wish to
exercise in this important judgment").
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In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.,56
the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal and state courts should defer to
Congress on the question of tribal sovereign immunity because Congress
alone is in the proper position to consider relevant policy interests.
57
Kiowa Tribe considered whether a tribal business that defaulted on a
commercial contract was immune from suit in state court where the
original contract was entered into off the reservation. 58 In its analysis,
the Court noted that there may be strong policy reasons to doubt the
wisdom of tribal sovereign immunity in an age where tribes engage in
commercial activity both on and off the reservation. 59 Nevertheless, the
Court declined to abrogate the tribe's sovereign immunity because doing
so would have been a departure from prior Court precedent. 60 Instead,
the Court chose to defer to Congress due to its comprehensive ability to
limit or alter tribal sovereign immunity and weigh the relevant policy
considerations .6 1
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court has established that courts may not
act to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. Courts must instead defer to
the plenary power of Congress to limit tribal sovereign immunity.
Therefore, in the absence of a congressional directive, courts may not
limit tribal sovereign immunity.
P
III. THE SOVEREIGN'S INTENT BEARS ON WHETHER A
FEDERAL OR STATE ENTITY ENJOYS IMMUNITY
61Sovereigns create entities to carry out the work of the government.
When a federally-created entity is sued, the courts inquire whether
63Congress intended to extend its sovereign immunity to the entity.
Similarly, when a state-created entity is sued, courts look to state law to
determine whether the state legislature intended to extend its sovereign
56. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
57. See id. at 759-60.
58. See id. at 753-54.
59. See id. at 758.
60. See id. at 758-60.
61. See id.
62. See Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstr. Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 389-90 (1939) (identifying
governments' historic use of corporations and agencies to conduct the work of governments and
listing numerous examples).
63. See id. at 389 ("Congress may, of course, endow a governmental corporation with the
government's immunity. But always the question is: has it done so?").
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immunity to the state-created entity.64 Courts defer to the intent of these
governments due to their status as sovereigns.65
A. Sovereigns Regularly Create Governmental Corporations and
Agencies Which May or May Not Enjoy Sovereign Immunity
Sovereigns create corporations and agencies to carry out the daily
business of the government.66 These governmental entities can interact
with the public and do business as any other member of the commercial
world.67 Nevertheless, the mere fact that a government-created entity
does the work of the government does not necessarily entitle it to share
in its creator's sovereign immunity. 68 When a government creates an
entity and authorizes it to engage in business and commercial
transactions, courts must determine whether sovereign immunity extends
to the entity or whether it is amenable to suit.6
9
B. Out of Respect for the Sovereignty of the Federal Government,
Courts Look to Congressional Statutory Intent in Determining
Whether a Federal Entity Enjoys Sovereign Immunity
When the United States creates a corporation or agency, the entity
does not enjoy immunity from suit unless such immunity is provided by
Congress.7 ° Although federal entities operating in a commercial context
64. See Alex E. Rogers, Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity:
Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1243, 1288-89
(1992).
65. See Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 231 (1935) (identifying the federal
government's plenary power over matters that affect its sovereignty); S.J. v. Hamilton County, 374
F.3d 416, 421-22 (6th Cir. 2004) (pointing to states' sovereignty as a reason to examine the state
law that created the entity in question and also as a reason to avoid limiting analysis to only ultimate
state financial liability).
66. See Keifer & Keifer, 306 U.S. at 389, 390 n.3 (identifying government's historic use of
corporations and agencies to conduct the work of government and identifying numerous examples,
such as the creation of the American Legion, Tennessee Valley Authority, and Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation).
67. See Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940).
68. See Keifer & Keifer, 306 U.S. at 388.
69. See Burr, 309 U.S. at 244; Keifer & Keifer, 306 U.S. at 389; Standard Oil Div., Am. Oil Co.
v. Starks, 528 F.2d 201, 202 (7th Cit. 1975); United States v. Edgerton & Sons, Inc., 178 F.2d 763,
764 (2d Cir. 1949).
70. See Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867, 874 n.6 (8th Cir. 1974); accord Keifer
& Keifer, 306 U.S. at 388-89.
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are presumed not to receive governmental immunity, 7' Congress may
grant them sovereign immunity. 72 The fundamental inquiry the courts
conduct is whether or not Congress intended to grant the governmental
entity immunity from suit. 73 This deference recognizes, generally, the
ultimate sovereignty of the federal government,74 and specifically, that a
sovereign is the ultimate source of its own courts' jurisdiction.75
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied these principles in
Standard Oil Division, American Oil Co. v. Starks,76 holding that the
U.S. Postal Service was not entitled to share in the federal government's
sovereign immunity.77 In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed to
express statutory language Congress included in the Postal
Reorganization Act giving the Postal Service the power to "sue or be
sued" and granting original jurisdiction to the United States District
Courts for any actions brought against the Postal Service.78 The court
also examined the enacting language of the statute to conclude that
despite its creation as a federally chartered agency, Congress
nevertheless intended the Postal Service to operate in a "business-like
way."'79 Because the statutory language indicated that Congress intended
the Postal Service to operate as an autonomous agency, the court
concluded that Congress did not intend for the Postal Service to share in
the federal government's sovereign immunity.8 °
71. See Reconstr. Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 84-86 (1941) (holding that
Congressional authorization for the federal Reconstruction Finance Corporation to "sue and be
sued" constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity); Burr, 309 U.S. at 245 ("[l~t must be presumed
that when Congress launched a governmental agency into the commercial world and endowed it
with authority to 'sue or be sued,' that agency is not less amenable to judicial process than a private
enterprise under like circumstances would be.").
72. See Burr, 309 U.S. at 244 ("Congress has full power to endow the Federal Housing
Administration with the government's immunity from suit or to determine the extent to which it
may be subjected to the judicial process."); Keifer & Keifer, 306 U.S. at 389 ("Congress may, of
course, endow a governmental corporation with the government's immunity.").
73. See Keifer & Keifer, 306 U.S. at 389.
74. See Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 231 (1935).
75. See Burr, 309 U.S. at 244, 251 (emphasizing Congress's ability to grant or withhold
immunity from suit to its entities).
76. 528 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1975).
77. See id. at 204.
78. See id. at 202-03.
79. See id. at 202.
80. See id. at 202-04.
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C. Out of Respect for State Sovereignty, Courts Examine the Intent of
the State Legislature To Help Determine Whether a State Entity
Enjoys Sovereign Immunity
State sovereign immunity bars suits not only in actions against a state
but also in actions against those governmental entities considered to be
an "arm of the state."8' To determine whether an entity is an arm of the
state, and thus entitled to sovereign immunity, courts examine the state's
intent in creating the entity.82 Courts make this inquiry into a state's
intent out of deference to the state's status as a sovereign.83 As the
primary factor in the intent analysis, courts consider how the state
legislature defined or characterized the entity in state law.84 In order to
extend state sovereign immunity, the entity must have a close
relationship with the state.85  Entities that are mere municipal
corporations or other political subdivisions, such as counties, do not
benefit from the state's immunity from suit.
86
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not laid down a dispositive test
to determine when an entity qualifies as an arm of the state, the Court's
81. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30 (1997) (holding that the
federal government's indemnification of the University of California for litigation costs, including
adverse judgments, does not alter the University's immunity from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment); S.J. v. Hamilton County, 374 F.3d 416, 419-20 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
juvenile training facility chartered by the state but funded and operated by the county is not an arm
of the state for sovereign immunity purposes).
82. See, e.g., S.J., 374 F.3d at 420 (considering factors such as "how state law defines the
entity"); Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2001) (relying in part
on "whether the state statutes and case law characterize the agency as an arm of the state");
Haldeman v. State of Wyo. Farm Loan Bd., 32 F.3d 469, 473 (10th Cir. 1994) (looking to "the
characterization of the district under state law" (quoting Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d
992, 994 (10th Cir. 1993))); Mitchell v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989)
("To determine these factors, the court looks to the way state law treats the entity."); Morris v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The important point for the
present case is that the state's characterization counted for something ...."); George R. Whitten,
Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177, 180-81 (1st Cir. 1974) (examining the state law
that created the State University Construction Fund and concluding that the Fund shares the state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit).
83. See S.J., 374 F.3d at 421-22 (citing the states' sovereignty as a reason to examine not only the
potential for state financial liability, but also the state law creating an entity).
84. See, e.g., id. at 420.
85. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)
(distinguishing entities that should be considered "arms of the state" from entities that are political
or municipal subdivisions).
86. See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. _, 126 S. Ct. 1689, 1693 (2006); Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999); Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280.
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decisions have consistently deemed the intent of the state legislature an
important factor.87 While the Court has balanced multiple factors, the list
of factors has not remained constant.88 To determine intent, the Court
analyzes the state legislature's characterization of the entity under state
law.89 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically noted that the
state law's characterization of an entity must be considered when
analyzing the applicability of state sovereign immunity.90
The Supreme Court's lack of uniform guidance has allowed the lower
courts to develop their own multi-factor balancing tests to determine
whether a state entity enjoys state sovereign immunity. 91 The circuit
courts of appeal have articulated different tests, utilizing anywhere from
two 92 to nine 93 different factors, to determine whether a state corporation
or agency is an "arm of the state" for purposes of sovereign immunity.
94
87. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401-02
(1979) (examining six factors in holding that a bi-state agency is not an arm of the state, including
the express intent of the states to create the agency as a "separate legal entity" and a "political
subdivision"); Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280-81 (examining four factors in holding that a local
school board is not an arm of the state, including how state law characterizes the local school
boards); see also Rogers, supra note 64, at 1243-44.
88. One legal commentator has described the Court's approach as "unintelligible," "ad hoc" and
plagued by "incoherence." See Rogers, supra note 64, at 1243. In Mt. Healthy, the Court examined
four factors in holding that a local school board is not an arm of the state: (1) how state law
characterizes local school boards; (2) the degree of supervision the State exercises over local school
boards; (3) how much funding the State provides to the school board; and (4) the board's ability to
generate revenue. 429 U.S. at 280-81. This contrasts with its approach just two years later in Lake
Country Estates, where the Court examined six factors in holding that a bi-state agency is not an
arm of the state: (1) the express intent of the States to create the agency as a "separate legal entity"
and a "political subdivision"; (2) the power of counties and cities to appoint six of ten governing
members of the agency, compared to only four appointed by the States; (3) the funding of the
agency from county rather than State funds; (4) the express provision that the agency's obligations
shall not be binding on the States; (5) whether the primary purpose of the agency, regulation of land
use, is one traditionally performed by local governments; and (6) the lack of any veto power by the
States over agency rules. 440 U.S. at 401-02.
89. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 401-02; Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280-81.
90. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 n.5 (1997).
91. See Rogers, supra note 64, at 1269-71.
92. See Haldeman v. State of Wyo. Farm Loan Bd., 32 F.3d 469, 473 (10th Cir. 1994) (examining
two factors: (1) the degree of autonomy given to the agency, informed by the characterization of the
agency by state law and the extent the state provided guidance and control; and (2) the amount of
financing the agency receives independent of the state and the agency's ability to provide its own
financing).
93. See Morris v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 223-28 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(examining all of the factors from both Mt. Healthy and Lake Country Estates in holding that a bi-
state transportation agency enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity).
94. See Rogers, supra note 64, at 1269-71.
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Nevertheless, while the lower courts examine different lists of factors,
the intent of the state legislature to extend sovereign immunity
consistently guides the courts' "arm of the state" inquiry.95
For example, in S.J. v. Hamilton County,96 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a juvenile training facility authorized by state law, but
funded mainly by a county, was not entitled to share in the state's
sovereign immunity.97 The court weighed four factors in its analysis,98
one of which considered whether the state legislature intended to extend
sovereign immunity to the training facility.99 The court considered the
state's intent by examining how the state legislature characterized the
facility under state law.' 00 Although the state law that created the facility
did not explicitly address sovereign immunity, the court noted the statute
labeled the entity a "single-county juvenile facility" rather than a state
facility.'0 ' The court also discussed and ultimately rejected the idea that
the state's ultimate financial liability alone could serve to determine
whether or not the facility enjoyed state sovereign immunity. 10 2 The
court concluded that examining ultimate financial liability alone, without
considering how the facility was characterized by state law, was an
insufficient method of analysis as it did not fully respect the state's
status as a sovereign.
10 3
In sum, a sovereign may create a corporation or agency to carry out
governmental objectives. When the federal government is the sovereign
creating the entity, courts defer to Congress's intent to determine
whether the entity should benefit from the federal government's
immunity from suit. When a state government is the relevant sovereign,
95. See Rogers, supra note 64, at 1269 (observing that "the state-law definition of the entity,
including state courts' characterization of the entity" is one of the broad categories courts
consistently consider in their analysis).
96. 374 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2004).
97. See id. at 423-24.
98. See id. The four factors examined were: "(1) whether the state would be responsible for a
judgment against the entity in question; (2) how state law defines the entity; (3) what degree of
control the state maintains over the entity; and (4) the source of the entity's funding." Id. at 420.
99. See id. at 422 (examining the statute that created the training facility to determine how the
state legislature characterized the entity).
100. See id.
101. See id. Counties are not entitled to sovereign immunity. See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham
County, 547 U.S. -_, 126 S. Ct. 1689, 1693 (2006); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999).
102. See S.J., 374 F.3d at 420-21.
103. See id. at 421. S.J. is the only federal case that squarely discusses whether financial liability
alone is sufficient to extend sovereign immunity to a state entity.
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courts defer to the state legislature's intent to determine whether the
entity should be considered an "arm of the state" for sovereign immunity
purposes. This judicial deference to the government's intent is based on
the government's status as a sovereign.
IV. COURTS HAVE NOT USED INTENT TO DETERMINE IF A
TRIBAL ENTITY ENJOYS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
While courts consider the sovereign's intent in determining sovereign
immunity in the federal and state government contexts, they have not
done so when considering whether tribal sovereign immunity extends to
a tribal entity. The U.S. Supreme Court has not established a test to
determine whether a tribal entity is entitled to sovereign immunity as an
"arm of the tribe."'' 0 4 State and lower courts have created multiple tests,
none of which expressly or consistently consider tribal intent when
determining whether a tribal entity is an "arm of the tribe."'1
0 5
A. Indian Tribes Create Entities under Federal, State and Tribal Law
Pursuant to their inherent powers, tribes create entities to carry out
their daily governmental activities and business.10 6 Tribes have the
power to incorporate their agencies and corporations under federal, state,
or tribal law. 10 7 As with federal and state entities, 0 8 courts are often
104. See Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 293-94 (Minn. 1996); Wright v. Colville
Tribal Enter. Corp., 147 P.3d 1275, 1283 n.5 (Wash. 2006) (Madsen, J., concurring).
105. See, e.g., Runyon v. Ass'n of Viii. Council Presidents, 84 P.3d 437, 440 (Alaska 2004)
(holding that ultimate financial liability is the paramount factor in determining whether or not a
tribal entity enjoys tribal sovereign immunity); Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund,
Inc., 658 N.E.2d 989, 992-93 (N.Y. 1995) (examining nine different factors to determine whether or
not a tribal entity enjoys tribal sovereign immunity, none of which are related to the tribe's intent).
106. See COHEN'S, supra note 18, at 1341-42.
107. See, e.g., Runyon, 84 P.3d at 438 (tribal corporation created under state law); Ransom, 658
N.E.2d at 991 (tribe created a nonprofit corporation under federal law); Wright, 147 P.3d at 1277
(corporation created under tribal code). Courts have not distinguished whether a tribal entity is
established under tribal, state or federal law in their sovereign immunity analysis. Whether different
outcomes are mandated depending on whether a tribe creates an entity under federal, state, or tribal
law is beyond the scope of this Comment.
108. See, e.g., S.J, 374 F.3d at 423-24 (holding that the state-created entity at issue does not
enjoy sovereign immunity and is therefore subject to the court's jurisdiction); Standard Oil Div.,
Am. Oil Co. v. Starks, 528 F.2d 201, 204 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that the federally-created entity at
issue does not enjoy sovereign immunity and is therefore subject to the court's jurisdiction); see
also supra Parts II.B-III.C.
219
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asked to assess whether such tribal entities share in a tribe's immunity
from suit. 109
B. Tribal Intent Is Neither Expressly nor Consistently Considered by
the Courts in Determining Whether a Tribal Entity Enjoys
Sovereign Immunity
The U.S. Supreme Court has not established a test to determine
whether tribal agencies and corporations share in a tribe's sovereign
immunity. 110 However, other courts have held that if a tribal entity
serves as an arm of the tribe, the entity enjoys the tribe's sovereign
immunity from suit."' While the U.S. Supreme Court has generally
recognized the "arm of the tribe" standard, 12 it has not clarified how a
tribal entity qualifies as an arm of the tribe.' 13
Both state and federal courts have created various tests to determine
whether a tribal entity is an arm of the tribe. For example, in Ransom v.
St. Regis Mohawk Education and Community Fund, 14 the New York
Court of Appeals identified nine factors that may be used to determine
whether a tribal entity enjoys sovereign immunity." 5 This approach
sharply contrasts with methods adopted by other courts."l 6 For example,
109. See, e.g., Runyon, 84 P.3d at 441 (holding that an Indian tribe's sovereign immunity did not
extend to a nonprofit Alaska corporation created by sovereign tribal villages).
110. See Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 293-94 (Minn. 1996); Wright, 147 P.3d at
1283 n.5 (Madsen, J., concurring).
11. See, e.g., Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a tribal community college incorporated under the tribe's constitution is entitled to
sovereign immunity).
112. See Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538
U.S. 701, 705 n.l (2003) ("The United States maintains, and the County does not dispute, that the
Corporation is an 'arm' of the Tribe for sovereign immunity purposes.").
113. See Gavle, 555 N.W.2d at 293-94; Wright, 147 P.3d at 1283 n.5 (Madsen, J., concurring).
114. 658 N.E.2d 989 (N.Y. 1995).
115. See id. at 992-93 (examining: (1) whether the entity is organized under the tribe's laws or
constitution; (2) the entity's purposes; (3) the composition of the entity's governing body; (4)
whether the tribe has legal title or ownership of property used by the entity; (5) whether tribal
officials exercise control over the administration or accounting activities of the entity; (6) whether
the tribe's governing body has power to dismiss members of the entity's governing body; (7)
whether the corporate entity generates its own revenue; (8) whether a suit against the entity will
impact the tribe's treasury; and (9) whether the entity has the power to bind or obligate the tribe's
funds).
116. Compare Ransom, 658 N.E.2d at 992-93 (examining nine factors in the "arm of the tribe"
analysis) with Runyon v. Ass'n of Vill. Council Presidents, 84 P.3d 437, 440 (Alaska 2004)
(examining ultimate financial liability as the sole factor in the "arm of the tribe" analysis).
220
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the Alaska State Supreme Court has applied a single factor test, holding
that if a tribe does not have ultimate financial liability for a judgment
against an entity, the entity is not entitled to tribal sovereign
immunity.' 
17
Despite the existence of a wide variety of tests, no test thus far
applied by a state or federal court explicitly looks to tribal law to
determine whether a tribe intended an entity to enjoy sovereign
immunity as an "arm of the tribe."'1 18 For example, in Wright v. Colville
Tribal Enterprise Corp.," 9  the Supreme Court of Washington
recognized that the Colville Tribes created a governmental entity under
the Colville Tribal Governmental Corporation Act (Act).12° The Act
expressly states that entities created thereunder "shall be considered to
be governmental agencies and instrumentalities ... entitled to all of the
privileges and immunities enjoyed by the Tribes; including but not
limited to, immunities from suit in Federal and State courts .... ,121 The
plurality opinion quotes this section of the Act, including the section
voicing the intent of the Tribes to cover the entity with their sovereign
immunity, in its facts section.1 22 The plurality held the entity was entitled
to sovereign immunity, however, not by considering the Tribes' intent
contained in the Act, but by adopting the view that "tribal sovereign
immunity protects tribal governmental corporations owned and
controlled by a tribe, and created under its own tribal laws."' 123 A
concurring opinion, however, disagreed with this broad rule and looked
instead to both the Tribes' ultimate financial liability and their intent as
117. See Runyon, 84 P.3d at 440.
118. See, e.g., id.; Ransom, 658 N.E.2d at 992-93. A few courts have examined tribal law to help
ascertain whether a tribal entity has a governmental or commercial purpose, but these courts have
not done so to examine a tribe's intent to waive or extend its sovereign immunity over the entity.
See, e.g., Gavle, 555 N.W.2d at 294-95 (examining a tribal gaming entity's articles of incorporation
to help ascertain whether it had a governmental or commercial purpose); Trudgeon v. Fantasy
Springs Casino, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 69-70 (1999) (examining the tribal ordinance creating a casino
to help ascertain whether it had a governmental or commercial purpose while noting that a
commercial purpose does not necessarily bar the entity from receiving tribal immunity).
119. 147 P.3d 1275 (Wash. 2006).
120. See id. at 1277. The Colville Tribal Governmental Corporation Act is a tribal law. See
COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE ch. 7-1-3 (1984), available at http://www.
tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/colvillelawandorder-CHPT7-1 .html.
121. COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE ch. 7-1-3 (1984), available at http://www.
tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/colvillelawandorderCHPT7- I.html.
122. See Wright, 147 P.3d at 1277.
123. See id. at 1279.
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expressed in the language of the incorporating Act to justify extending
tribal sovereign immunity to the entity. 
24
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court has not established a test to
determine whether an entity is an "arm of the tribe" entitled to sovereign
immunity. Lower courts have created various balancing tests to make
this determination. None of these tests explicitly consider tribal intent as
a pertinent factor.
V. THE TRIBE'S INTENT SHOULD BEAR ON WHETHER A
TRIBAL ENTITY IS ENTITLED TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In deference to the sovereign, courts evaluating claims of federal and
state sovereign immunity examine whether the sovereign intended to
extend immunity to a governmental entity. 125 The federal government,
state governments, and Indian tribes all enjoy the same general powers
of sovereignty126 and inherent immunity from suit. 127 Therefore, courts
should also examine the intent of the tribe to extend sovereign immunity
to a tribal entity. When a court does not examine tribal intent, it may
impermissibly alter the scope of tribal sovereign immunity.
124. See id. at 1284-85 (Madsen, J., concurring). It is interesting to note that the Washington
State Court of Appeals decision which was reversed in Wright adopted an entirely different
approach from both the plurality and concurring opinions. See Wright v. Colville Tribal Enter.
Corp., 127 Wash. App. 644, 111 P.3d 1244 (2005), rev'd, 147 P.3d 1275 (2006). The Court of
Appeals recognized that the Colville Tribes created the governmental entity under the Act. See id. at
646, 111 P.3d at 1246. Despite the express demonstration of intent in the Act, the court made no
mention of this language when considering the extension of tribal sovereign immunity to the entity.
The Washington State Court of Appeals, like the Alaska Supreme Court, looked only to the question
of ultimate financial liability without weighing any other factors. See Wright, 127 Wash. App. at
654-56, 111 P.3d at 1250.
125. See Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 231 (1935) (deference given to the
federal government's intent due to its sovereign power); S.J. v. Hamilton County, 374 F.3d 416,
421-22 (6th Cir. 2004) (pointing to the states' sovereignty as a reason to examine a state's intent as
demonstrated by the state law creating the entity).
126. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978) (recognizing that Indian tribes
exercise the inherent powers common to all sovereigns, including creating and enforcing their own
laws).
127. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) ("Indian tribes have long been
recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign
powers.").
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A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity Is Entitled to the Same Treatment as
Federal and State Sovereign Immunity When Assessing Whether a
Governmental Entity Is Immune from Suit
In recognition of the sovereign's right to rule, courts examine the
federal and state governments' intent to extend sovereign immunity to a
governmental entity. 28 The courts defer to Congress's intent to extend
federal sovereign immunity to a federal agency or corporation out of
respect for these sovereign rights. 29 Similarly, when deciding whether a
state agency or corporation enjoys sovereign immunity, courts consider
the intent of the state legislature.
130
The power of tribes to extend their sovereign immunity to tribal
entities has not been altered by Congress and therefore does not operate
differently than that of the federal and state governments.' 3' Unless
altered by Congress, tribal sovereign immunity operates in the same
manner as federal and state sovereign immunities. 32  All three
governments retain the power to extend their sovereign immunity to a
governmental entity.133 Courts, therefore, should apply the same test
when determining sovereign immunity whether dealing with a federal,
state, or tribal entity.
When determining whether a tribal entity enjoys immunity from suit,
some courts have looked only to the ultimate financial liability of the
tribe without examining tribal intent. 34 Courts have found such an
128. See Priddy, 295 U.S. at 231 (noting that deference is given to the federal government due to
its sovereign power); S.J., 374 F.3d at 421-22 (pointing to states' sovereignty as a reason to
examine state law creating an entity and to not limit analysis to only ultimate state financial
liability).
129. See Priddy, 295 U.S. at 231.
130. See Rogers, supra note 64, at 1288-91.
131. See Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 555
N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1996) (stating that "Congress has left the issue unresolved" in holding a tribal
casino organized under tribal law benefited from the tribe's sovereign immunity).
132. See supra Part I.
133. See, e.g., Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 244 (1940) (holding that Congress has
the power to determine whether or not a federal agency shares in the federal government's
sovereign immunity); Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir.
2000) (holding that a tribal community college incorporated under the tribe's constitution is entitled
to sovereign immunity); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177,
180-81 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that a state-created entity, the State University Construction Fund,
shares the state's immunity from suit).
134. See, e.g., Runyon v. Ass'n of Vill. Council Presidents, 84 P.3d 437, 440 (Alaska 2004)
(examining ultimate financial liability as the sole factor in the "arm of the tribe" analysis); Wright v.
Colville Tribal Enter. Corp., 127 Wash. App. 644, Il1 P.3d 1244 (2005), rev'd, 147 P.3d 1275
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approach to be insufficient in the context of state sovereign immunity. 135
Tribal and state sovereign immunity share identical theoretical
underpinnings.1 36 Because ultimate financial liability of the sovereign is
insufficient in the state context, it should also be insufficient in the tribal
context.
State and federal courts, in determining whether tribal entities are
subject to suit, must examine whether the tribe intended for the entity to
share in its immunity. To do so, the courts must look to the tribal law
that created the entity to inform their decision. Congress has not
expressly acted to change the tribes' common law immunity from suit as
it relates to entities created by tribal governments. 137 Therefore, courts
must interpret sovereign immunity consistently in the federal, state, and
tribal contexts. The courts examine the intent of the sovereign to extend
its immunity from suit when the sovereign is the federal government or a
state government. 138 They must do likewise when the sovereign is an
Indian tribe.
Although tribal intent alone may not be Sufficient to extend tribal
sovereign immunity to tribal entities, it should be the touchstone courts
use to begin their analysis of whether an entity is an arm of the tribe.
139
If an Indian tribe stipulates that a tribal entity is immune from suit,
courts err if they do not give the same deference to the tribe's intent that
they give to federal and state intent when examining entities created
under federal and state law.
B. The Judiciary Must Defer to the Power of Congress to Limit the
Scope of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
While Congress may implement legislation to limit tribal sovereign
immunity, the courts may not impose judicial limitations on the tribes'
(Wash. 2006).
135. See, e.g., S.J. v. Hamilton County, 374 F.3d 416, 421-22 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing the
states' sovereignty as a reason to examine state law creating an entity and to not limit analysis to
only ultimate state financial liability).
136. See supra Part I.
137. See Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), affid, 555
N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1996) (stating that "Congress has left the issue unresolved" in holding a tribal
casino organized under tribal law benefited from the tribe's sovereign immunity).
138. See supra Parts III.B-C.
139. This Comment does not suggest that a tribe could share its sovereign immunity with an
entity that is an arm of the tribe in name only.
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immunity from suit. 40 Barring congressional abrogation or limitation of
tribal sovereign immunity, tribes are entitled to the same respect as other
sovereigns. When courts deprive a tribal entity of immunity from suit
without considering the tribe's intent, they impermissibly abrogate the
tribe's sovereign immunity. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, courts
cannot abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. 141 The judiciary must defer
to the power of Congress to make such an abrogation. 42 Courts are not
in the proper position to consider and balance relevant policy and
reliance interests. 143 Courts impermissibly limit the scope of tribal
sovereign immunity by making it narrower than federal and state
sovereign immunity when they do not consider the tribe's intent.
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal, state, and tribal governments receive sovereign immunity as
an incident of their sovereignty. Courts examine the federal and state
governments' intent to extend or deny sovereign immunity to a
governmental entity out of deference to their sovereign status. Courts
should similarly examine tribal intent when determining whether a tribal
entity enjoys sovereign immunity from suit out of deference to the
tribe's sovereign status. When a court does not consider the tribe's intent
it limits the scope of tribal sovereign immunity. Such an abrogation of
tribal sovereign immunity is impermissible in light of Supreme Court
precedent and Congress's silence on the issue.
140. See id. at 758-60.
141. See Kiowa Tribe ofOkla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758-60 (1998).
142. See id.
143. See id. at 759.
226
